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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(h) of the Utah Code 
Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in denying 
petitioner's (Ms. Seals') request for an award of the 
attorney fees which she was forced to incur in connection 
with respondent's (Mr. Condie's) bankruptcy proceedings for 
the purpose of enforcing an hold harmless provision of the 
Decree of Divorce. A trial court's decision regarding a 
request for attorney fees in divorce proceedings is reviewed 
for abuse of discretion. Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 
(Utah App. 1988). This issue was preserved in Ms. Seals' 
Motion for Judgment of Support Arrears Etc. and for a 
Finding of Contempt. (R. 258) 
2. Whether the trial court erred in its conclusion of 
law that Mr. Condie's bankruptcy proceedings were the 
appropriate time and place for Ms. Seals to have asked for 
an award of the attorney fees which she incurred in order to 
protect her rights under the Decree of Divorce. A trial 
court's conclusions of law are reviewable for correctness. 
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Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 
P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). This issue was preserved in 
Ms. Seals' Motion for Judgment of Support Arrears Etc. and 
for a Finding of Contempt. (R. 258) 
3. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that 
the adversary proceeding which Ms. Seals filed in Mr. 
Condie's bankruptcy proceedings to determine the 
dischargeability of Mr. Condie's obligations under the 
Decree of Divorce was wholly unnecessary initially because 
Ms. Seals was not a named creditor in the bankruptcy 
proceedings. A trial court's conclusions of law are 
reviewable for correctness. Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt 
Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). 
This issue was preserved in Ms. Seals' Motion for Judgment 
of Support Arrears Etc. and for a Finding of Contempt. 
(R. 258) 
4. Whether the trial court erred in its 
conclusion/finding that the parties' Hopkinsville Federal 
Savings Bank (HFSB) obligation was satisfied in April 2001. 
A trial court's conclusions of law are reviewable for 
correctness. Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. 
Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). This issue was 
2 
preserved in Ms, Seals' Motion for Judgment of Support 
Arrears Etc. and for a Finding of Contempt. (R. 258) 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(2) 
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) 
11 U.S.C. § 727 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Third 
Judicial District Court of Tooele County denying Ms. Seals' 
request for an award of the attorney fees which she incurred 
in Mr. Condie's bankruptcy proceedings for the purpose of 
preventing Mr. Condie from discharging his obligations under 
the hold harmless provisions of the Decree of Divorce. 
II. Statement of Facts 
L A Decree of Divorce was entered in this action on 
November 22, 1999. (R. 145) 
2. Paragraph 14 of the Decree of Divorce orders Mr. 
Condie to "assume complete responsibility for all loans, 
debts and obligations, whether incurred by [Mr. Condie] or 
incurred jointly as husband and wife, with the exception of 
the loan on the 1995 Eagle Vision automobile, which [Ms. 
3 
Seals] shall assume/' (R. 139) 
3. One of the obligations which Mr, Condie was ordered 
to assume was a promissory note which the parties executed 
in favor of the Hopkinsville Federal Savings Bank in April 
of 1997. The promissory note was secured by a parcel of 
real property which Ms. Seals owned in Tooele County, Utah. 
(R. 272) 
4. Unfortunately, Mr. Condie failed to make the 
payments called for under the promissory note and in August 
of 2000 Hopkinsville Federal Savings Bank filed an action 
against the parties in the state of Kentucky to collect the 
amount due and owing. (R. 272) 
5. Shortly thereafter on December 29, 2000, Mr. Condie 
filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the 
Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for 
the District of Utah. (R. 348) 
6. Mr. Condie failed to list Ms. Seals as a creditor 
on his initial bankruptcy schedules. However, by letter 
dated January 24, 2001, Mr. Condie gave Ms. Seals the 
following notice of his bankruptcy proceedings: 
"... you are hereby given notice of [my bankruptcy 
proceedings] and informed that the debt due you will be 
discharged the same as if your debt had been duly 
listed and scheduled, under section 523(a)(3)(A) of the 
4 
Bankruptcy Code. In particular, if you believe the 
debt owing to Hopkinsville Federal Bank should be 
declared nondischargeable pursuant to paragraph 14 of 
the Decree of Divorce ... then I would advise you to 
file a claim with the abovementioned bankruptcy court. 
If you do not file a claim with the bankruptcy court to 
determine whether the debt to Hopkinsville Federal 
Savings Bank is nondischargeable ... then the debt may 
be discharged under section 524(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy 
Code, and a discharge operates as an injunction against 
any act to collect a discharged debt." 
(R. 551-552) 
7. Accordingly, Ms. Seals was required to retain an 
attorney experienced in bankruptcy matters to file an 
adversary proceeding in Mr. Condie's bankruptcy case 
objecting to Mr. Condie's attempt to discharge his 
obligation under the Decree of Divorce to hold Ms. Seals 
harmless from the HFSB obligation. Ms. Seals was required 
to pay the bankruptcy attorney $6,715.75 (R. 271) in order 
to obtain a Partial Summary Judgment in which the bankruptcy 
court ruled that Mr. Condie's obligation to hold Ms. Seals 
harmless from the HFSB note and mortgage was 
nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15). (R. 263) 
8. On or about March 30, 2001, HFSB assigned the note 
and the mortgage on the Tooele County property to a limited 
liability company managed by Mr. Condie's friend and former 
employer, Brian W. Steffensen. (R. 648) 
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9. In or around April 2004, Mr. Condie paid the 
remaining balance of the HFSB Note and Mr. Steffensen 
executed a Release of Note and Mortgage on April 26, 2004, 
thereby clearing title to the Tooele County property. 
(R. 647) 
10. On or about August 11, 2004, Ms. Seals filed a 
Motion for Judgment of Support Arrears Etc. and for a 
Finding of Contempt. In her motion Ms. Seals requested, 
inter alia, that the trial court enter a judgment in her 
favor and against Mr. Condie for the amount of attorney fees 
which she was forced to incur in connection with Mr. 
Condie's bankruptcy proceedings in order to prevent Mr. 
Condie's obligation to hold Ms. Seals harmless from the HFSB 
Note from being discharged under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(c)(1) & 
727. (R. 258) 
11. Following an evidentiary hearing held December 8 
and 9, 2004, the trial court issued its Order on 
Petitioner's Motion for Judgment and for a Finding of 
Contempt in which it denied Ms. Seals' request for a 
judgment for the attorney fees which she incurred in 
6 
connection with Mr. Condie's bankruptcy proceedings. 
(R. 426) The trial court explained its denial as follows: 
The Bankruptcy Court in its ruling on Seals' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment did not award attorney's fees, 
nor did the parties in their subsequent Stipulation and 
Settlement provide for the recoupment of attorney's 
fees for the services of Steven Rupp in pursuing an 
adversarial proceeding against Condie. Those 
proceedings were the appropriate time and place for the 
parties to ask for attorney's fees and this Court will 
not grant such fees on that basis. Furthermore, the 
evidence suggests that the adversarial proceeding was 
wholly unnecessary initially, as Seals was not a named 
creditor in the bankruptcy proceedings... Finally, this 
Court notes that the Hopkinsville obligation was 
satisfied in April 2001, thus making any subsequent 
proceedings in bankruptcy wholly unnecessary... 
(R. 425-424) 
12. Ms. Seals filed her motion to alter or amend the 
Order on Petitioner's Motion for Judgment and for a Finding 
of Contempt on or about February 11, 2005. (R. 419) 
13. The trial court issued its Ruling and Order 
denying Ms. Seals' motion to alter or amend on March 14, 
2005. (R. 495) 
14. On April 27, 2005, the trial court entered its 
final Order and Judgment denying Ms. Seals' request for a 
judgment for the amount of attorney fees which she incurred 
in connection with Mr. Condie's bankruptcy proceedings. 
(R. 510-509) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused its discretion in denying Ms. 
Seals' request for an award of the attorney fees which she 
was forced to incur in connection with Mr. Condie's 
bankruptcy proceedings because its decision was based upon 
an erroneous conclusion of law. The trial court concluded 
that Mr. Condie's bankruptcy proceedings were the 
appropriate time and place for Ms. Seals to have asked for 
an award of attorney fees. Bankruptcy courts, however, 
follow the "American Rule" under which attorney fees are 
ordinarily not recoverable in cases brought upon or 
involving bankruptcy law absent specific statutory authority 
or a contractual right. E.g., Dennison v. Hammond (In re 
Hammond), 236 B.R. 751, 769 (Bankr. D.Ut. 1998). Ms. Seals did 
not have a contractual right to attorney fees in Mr. 
Condie's bankruptcy proceedings and there is no statute 
authorizing an award of attorney fees in connection with 
litigation prosecuted under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15). Id. 
The trial court also erred in its conclusion that Ms. 
Seals' § 523(a)(15) adversary proceeding was wholly 
unnecessary because Ms. Seals was not a named creditor in 
Mr. Condie's bankruptcy proceedings. A bankruptcy discharge 
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is a matter of law. See 11 U.S.C. § 727. Because Ms. Seals 
had actual knowledge of Mr. Condie's bankruptcy proceedings, 
any debt which Mr. Condie owed to her would have been 
discharged whether or not it was listed on Mr. Condie's 
bankruptcy schedules unless Ms. Seals had timely filed her 
complaint objecting to dischargeability under 11 U.S.C. § 
523(a) (15). See, e.g., In re Price, 871 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 
1989) ; and Cohen & Miller, Consumer Bankruptcy Manual § 
4:231 at page 4-450 ("when the creditor has notice or actual 
knowledge of the case in time ... for timely requesting a 
dischargeability determination, the debtor's omissions 
[i.e., failing to list the creditor on the debtor's 
schedules] cannot be used by the creditor to except its debt 
from discharge"). 
Finally, the trial court erred in concluding that the 
parties' Hopkinsville Federal Savings Bank obligation was 
satisfied in April 2001. All that happened in April of 2001 
was that a Utah limited liability company managed by Mr. 
Condies' friend and former employer, Brian W. Steffensen, 
purchased the HFSB note and mortgage. However, the note and 
mortgage were clearly not satisfied at that time and it was 
not until April of 2004 that Mr. Condie finally paid the 
9 
note off and Mr. Steffensen executed a Release of [the HFSB] 
Note and Mortgage. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING MS. 
SEALS' REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES BECAUSE ITS DECISION 
WAS BASED UPON A MISUNDERSTANDING OF BANKRUPTCY LAW AND 
ITS ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION THAT THE HFSB NOTE AND 
MORTGAGE HAD BEEN SATISFIED IN APRIL 2001. 
In its January 31, 2005 Order on Petitioner's Motion 
for Judgment and for a Finding of Contempt, the trial court 
explained its denial of Ms. Seals' request for an award of 
the attorney fees which she was forced to incur in 
connection with Mr. Condie's bankruptcy proceedings as 
follows: 
The Bankruptcy Court in its ruling on Seals' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment did not award attorney's fees, 
nor did the parties in their subsequent Stipulation and 
Settlement provide for the recoupment of attorney's 
fees for the services of Steven Rupp in pursuing an 
adversarial proceeding against Condie. Those 
proceedings were the appropriate time and place for the 
parties to ask for attorney's fees and this Court will 
not grant such fees on that basis. Furthermore, the 
evidence suggests that the adversarial proceeding was 
wholly unnecessary initially, as Seals was not a named 
creditor in the bankruptcy proceedings... Finally, this 
Court notes that the Hopkinsville obligation was 
satisfied in April 2001, thus making any subsequent 
proceedings in bankruptcy wholly unnecessary... 
(R. 425-424) As demonstrated below, the trial court's 
conclusions are premised on its misunderstanding of 
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bankruptcy law and its erroneous conclusion that the HFSB 
note and mortgage had been satisfied when they were assigned 
to Mr. Condie's friend, Brian Steffensen, in April 2001. 
A. The Bankruptcy Court did not have authority to award 
Ms. Seals' attorney fees. 
Bankruptcy courts follow the "American Rule" under 
which attorney fees are ordinarily not recoverable unless 
authorized by statute or contract. E.g., Dennison v. Hammond 
(In re Hammond), 236 B.R. 751, 769 (Bankr. D.Ut. 1998). The 
Dennison case is directly on point. As in the case at bar, 
in Dennison the non-debtor spouse filed a complaint in the 
debtor spouse's bankruptcy proceedings seeking a 
determination that a debt owed to her by the debtor under 
their Utah state court Decree of Divorce was non-
dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (15). The non-debtor 
spouse also sought an award of the attorney fees which she 
paid to prosecute her § 523(a)(15) action. The bankruptcy 
court ruled that the debt was non-dischargeable, but denied 
the request for attorney fees, explaining as follows: 
For the Debtor to be required to pay [the non-debtor 
spouse's] attorney fees for this proceeding, there must 
be an underlying basis for the award cognizable in 
federal court. "Under the ^American Rule', in cases 
brought upon or involving federal law, attorneys' fees 
are ordinarily not recoverable absent a specific 
statutory authority, a contractual right or aggravated 
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conduct." The [parties'] Decree does not contain a 
provision allowing for reasonable expenses incurred in 
enforcing the Decree [and] [w]e have found no case law, 
contractual or statutory basis for an award of [the 
non-debtor spouse's] attorney fees incurred in this [§ 
523(a) (15)] proceeding, and therefore deny the same. 
236 B.R. at 769 (citations omitted). 
Even if Ms. Seals' Decree of Divorce specifically 
provided for the recovery of attorney fees incurred in 
enforcing its terms, such fees would have been recoverable 
in bankruptcy court only to the extent that they were 
incurred in litigating state law issues. Renfrow v. Draper, 
232 F.3d 688, 694 (9th Cir. 2000)("if a divorce decree 
provides for the payment of attorney's fees, and state law 
issues are litigated in the bankruptcy proceedings, 
attorney's fees are available, but only to the extent that 
they are incurred litigating the state law issues"); see 
also Fobian v. Western Farm Credit Bank (In re Fobian), 951 
F.2d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 1991) cert, denied 505 U.S. 1220, 
112 S.Ct. 3031, 120 L.Ed.2d 902 (1992)(attorney fees cannot 
be awarded "despite an express contractual provision because 
the substantive litigation raised federal bankruptcy law 
issues rather than ^basic contract enforcement questions'"); 
Chance v. White (In re White), 265 B.R. 547, 560-561 
(Bkrtcy. N.D.Tex. 2001)(attorney fees cannot be awarded in 
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connection with § 523(a)(15) litigation despite Texas 
statute authorizing divorce court to award fees in divorce 
proceedings); and Colbert v. Colbert (In re Colbert), 185 
B.R. 247, 250 (Bkrtcy. M.D.Tenn. 1995) (§ 523(a) (15) inquiry 
is to "determine what portion of the award in state court is 
nondischargeable, not to award additional support or create 
new, nondischargeable debt"). Accordingly, because the only 
issue litigated in Mr. Condie's bankruptcy proceedings was 
whether his debt to Ms. Seals was dischargeable under 11 
U.S.C. § 523(a) (15)1, a federal bankruptcy law issue, Ms. 
Seals' attorney fees would not have been recoverable even if 
authorized under the Decree of Divorce. 
Conversely, Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(2) authorized the 
trial court to award Ms. Seals' attorney fees under the 
circumstances of the case at bar: 
In any action to enforce an order of ... division of 
property in a domestic case, the court may award costs 
and attorney fees upon determining that the party 
substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense... 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(2). 
Thus, the trial court's conclusion that Mr. Condie's 
bankruptcy proceedings were the appropriate time and place 
for Ms. Seals to have sought an award of attorney fees is 
X(R. 598-603) 
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premised its misunderstanding of the bankruptcy court's 
authority to award attorney fees. Accordingly, unless the 
trial court's Order and Judgment is reversed with 
instructions for the trial court to properly exercise its 
discretion under § 30-3-3(2) in deciding Ms. Seals' request 
for attorney fees, Mr. Condie will have successfully avoided 
to a great extent his obligations under the hold harmless 
provision of the Decree of Divorce. 
B. Because Ms. Seals had actual knowledge of Mr. 
Condie's bankruptcy proceedings she was forced to file 
her § 523(a)(15) action or Mr. Condie's debt to her 
would have been discharged under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(c) 
and 727. 
As set forth above, the trial court concluded that Ms. 
Seals' "adversarial proceeding was wholly unnecessary 
initially, as Seals was not a named creditor in the 
bankruptcy proceedings."2 Ms. Seals respectfully submits 
that this conclusion is unfounded. A bankruptcy discharge 
is a matter of law. See 11 U.S.C. § 727. Because Ms. Seals 
had actual knowledge of Mr. Condie's bankruptcy proceedings, 
any debt which Mr. Condie owed to her would have been 
discharged whether or not it was listed on Mr. Condie's 
2(R. 424) 
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bankruptcy schedules unless Ms. Seals had timely3 filed her 
complaint objecting to dischargeability under 11 U.S.C. § 
523(a) (15). See, e.g., In re Price, 871 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 
1989)("The statutory language [of section 523(a)(3)(B)] 
clearly contemplates that mere knowledge of a pending 
bankruptcy proceeding is sufficient to bar the claim of a 
creditor who took no action, whether or not that creditor 
received official notice from the court of various pertinent 
dates"); and Cohen & Miller, Consumer Bankruptcy Manual § 
4:231 at page 4-450 ("when the creditor has notice or actual 
knowledge of the case in time ... for timely requesting a 
dischargeability determination, the debtor's omissions 
[i.e., failing to list the creditor on the debtor's 
schedules] cannot be used by the creditor to except its debt 
from discharge"). Section 523(c)(1) specifically provides 
that 
... the debtor shall be discharged from a debt of a 
kind specified in paragraph ... (15) of subsection (a) 
of this section, unless, on request of the creditor to 
whom such debt is owed, and after notice an a hearing, 
the court determines such debt to be excepted from 
3Ms. Seals was required to file her adversary proceeding no 
later than 60 days after the first date set for Mr. Condie's 
meeting of creditors. Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4007. 
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discharge under paragraph ... (15) ... of subsection 
(a) of this section. 
11 U.S.C. § 523(c) (1) . 
That Mr. Condie was well aware of the necessity of Ms. 
Seals' § 523(a) (15) action is clearly revealed in his letter 
of January 24, 2001, in which he gave Ms. Seals the 
following warning: 
"... you are hereby given notice of [my bankruptcy 
proceedings] and informed that the debt due you will be 
discharged the same as if your debt had been duly 
listed and scheduled, under section 523(a)(3)(A) of the 
Bankruptcy Code. In particular, if you believe the 
debt owing to Hopkinsville Federal Bank should be 
declared nondischargeable pursuant to paragraph 14 of 
the Decree of Divorce ... then I would advise you to 
file a claim with the abovementioned bankruptcy court. 
If you do not file a claim with the bankruptcy court to 
determine whether the debt to Hopkinsville Federal 
Savings Bank is nondischargeable ... then the debt may 
be discharged under section 524(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy 
Code, and a discharge operates as an injunction against 
any act to collect a discharged debt." 
(R. 551-552)(emphasis added). 
In short, the trial court's conclusion that Ms. Seals' 
§ 523(a) (15) action was unnecessary because she was not 
listed as a creditor in Mr. Condie's bankruptcy proceedings 
is erroneous. As Mr. Condie himself recognized, Ms. Seals 
was forced to prosecute her adversary proceeding or Mr. 
Condie's debt to her would have been discharged under 11 
U.S.C. §§ 523(c) & 727. 
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C. The HFSB Note and Mortgage were not satisfied in 
April 2001, they were merely assigned to Mr. Condie's 
friend. 
The trial court's final explanation for denying Ms. 
Seals' request for the attorney fees incurred in connection 
with Mr. Condie's bankruptcy proceedings is that "the 
Hopkinsville obligation was satisfied in April 2001, thus 
making any subsequent proceedings in bankruptcy wholly 
unnecessary.. /' (R. 424) Ms. Seals respectfully submits 
that this explanation is a conclusion of law which is 
unfounded. However, to the extent that it can be 
characterized as a finding of fact, Ms. Seals will marshal 
the evidence. 
The only evidence which would support a finding that 
the Hopkinsville Federal Savings Bank obligation was 
satisfied in April 2001 is Mr. Condie's testimony and only 
if that testimony is taken out of context. 
Q. All right. Now, you ultimately got the note taken 
care of; correct? You got the loan satisfied with 
Hopkinsville and the debt satisfied? 
A. Correct... The note and the mortgage to Hopkinsville 
Federal was assigned to a Utah LLC managed by Brian 
Steffensen, who I worked for at the time. 
Q. Okay. Did you notify [Ms. Seals] that the the 
note had been satisfied? 
A. Yes, I had. 
17 
Q. Okay. Did Hopkinsville Federal, did they continue 
to pursue their [collection] action against [Ms. Seals] 
once the note had been satisfied? 
A. No. It was dismissed. 
THE COURT: When was the dismissal? 
THE WITNESS: The dismissal was April... 
THE COURT: Of what year? 
THE WITNESS: Of 2001. 
(R. 550 at page 86, line 5 through page 87, line 2) 
Based upon this testimony alone it would have been 
reasonable for the trial court to conclude that the HFSB 
note and mortgage had been satisfied in April 2001 and, 
therefore, that Ms. Seals' subsequent adversary proceeding 
was unnecessary. However, it is very clear not only from 
Mr. Condie's own testimony, but also from the other evidence 
presented at the hearing, that the HFSB obligation was not 
satisfied until April of 2004. 
Mr. Condies' friend, Brian Steffensen, purchased and 
took an assignment of the HFSB note and mortgage on or about 
March 30, 2001. (R. 648) Thereafter, Mr. Condie began 
making payments on the note to Mr. Steffensen. (R. 550 at 
page 128, lines 18-25). However, it was not until April 
2004 that Mr. Condie finished paying the note and Mr. 
18 
Steffensen executed a Release of [the HFSB] Note and 
Mortgage. (R. 647) 
Q. ...did Brian Steffensen ever pursue a collection 
action 
A. No. 
Q. ...Did you ultimately satisfy that 
A. Yes. 
Q. obligation? 
When did you satisfy that obligation? 
A. It was released in April of this year, April of 
2004. 
(R. 550 at page 113, line 24 through page 114, line 10). 
At the conclusion of the December 2004 hearing the 
trial court understood that the HFSB obligation was not 
satisfied until April 2004 and Mr. Condie's counsel did not 
suggest otherwise: 
THE COURT: ... Efforts were undertaken to take care of 
the Hopkinsville debt, but that but when we say 
we've satisfied it, satisfaction typically means that 
the obligation's been released and security that's been 
pledged has now been returned. That wasn't the case 
here. It was simply assigned to somebody else. 
Mr. Jennings: Right. Someone who was never actively 
pursuing litigation against the against it. 
(R. 550 at page 178, lines 16-23) 
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It may be that by the time the trial court issued its 
January 1, 2005 Order on Petitioner's Motion for Judgment 
and for a Finding of Contempt4 (nearly two months after the 
December 2004 hearing) the trial court simply failed to 
recollect the time period in which the HFSB obligation was 
satisfied. In any event, it is very clear that the trial 
court's conclusion/finding that the HFSB obligation was 
satisfied in April 2001 when it was assigned to Mr. 
Steffensen is erroneous. It was not satisfied until April 
of 2004 when Mr. Condie completed his payments to Mr. 
Steffensen and Mr. Steffensen executed a Release of Note and 
Mortgage. 
CONCLUSION 
As demonstrated above, the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying Ms. Seals' request for the attorney 
fees which she incurred in prosecuting her § 523(a) (15) 
action in Mr. Condie's bankruptcy proceeding. Contrary to 
the trial court's conclusion, Mr. Condie's bankruptcy 
proceedings were not the time and place for Ms. Seals to 
have sought attorney fees because the bankruptcy court did 
not have authority to award Ms. Seals' attorney fees. Also 
4(R. 426) 
20 
contrary to the trial court's conclusion, Ms. Seals was 
forced to file her adversary proceedings despite the fact 
that Mr. Condie initially failed to list her as a creditor 
because she had actual knowledge of Mr. Condie's bankruptcy 
proceedings. Finally, the trial court's conclusion/finding 
that Ms. Seals' § 523(a)(15) action was unnecessary because 
the HFSB obligation had been satisfied in^April 2001 is 
clearly erroneous. While Mr. Condie's friend purchased and 
took an assignment of the note and mortgage in April 2001, 
they were not satisfied until April 2004 when Mr. Condie 
finished paying the note and his friend executed a Release 
of Note and Mortgage. 
Based on the foregoing, Ms. Seals respectfully requests 
that the trial court's Order and Judgment be reversed to the 
extent that it denied Ms. Seals' request for a judgment for 
the attorney fees incurred in connection with Mr. Condie's 
bankruptcy proceedings and that this matter be remanded to 
the trial court for further proceedings. Ms. Seals also 
requests an award of attorney fees incurred in prosecuting 
this appeal in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(2)-. 
21 
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dren 5 to 18 years of age 
Minimum schedule for parent-time for chil-
dren undei five years of age 
Special circumstances 
Relocation 
Pilot Program for Expedited Parent-time En-
forcement 
3&~3-£. Procedure — Residence — Grounds. 
(1) P r o c e e c i m g S m divorce are commenced and conducted as 
provide^ by law for proceedings in civil causes, except as 
piovided
 m this chapter 
(2) Tl\e court may decree a dissolution of the marriage 
contract between the petitioner and respondent on the 
grounds specified m Subsection (3) in all cases where the 
petitioner
 o r respondent has been an actual and bona fide 
resident
 0f this state and of the county where the action is 
brought,
 o r if members of the armed forces of the United 
States \>ho are not legal residents of this state, where the 
petitions! has been stationed in this state under military 
orders, for three months next prior to the commencement of 
the actiQn 
(3) Gr o u n o !s for divoice 
(a) impotency of the respondent at the time of mar 
n a g e , 
(h) adultery committed by the respondent subsequent 
t o
 *narnage, 
te) willful desertion of the petitioner by the respondent 
f° r more than one year, 
(<}) willful neglect of the respondent to provide for the 
petitioner the common necessaries of life, 
($) habitual drunkenness of the respondent, 
(f) conviction of the respondent for a felony, 
(§) cruel t reatment of the petitioner by the respondent 
t o
 the extent of causing bodily injury or great mental 
distress to the petitioner, 
(h) irreconcilable differences of the marriage, 
d) incurable insanity, or 
(j) when the husband and wife have lived separately 
u n
^ e r a decree of separate maintenance of any state for 
t n r s e consecutive years without cohabitation 
(4) A decree of divorce granted under Subsection (3)(j) does 
not affect the liability of either party under any provision for 
separate maintenance previously granted 
(5) (§) A divorce may not be granted on the grounds of 
i n s a m t y unless 
(I) the respondent has been adjudged insane by the 
appropriate authorities of this or another state pi lor 
to the commencement of the action, and 
(II) the court finds by the testimony of competent 
witnesses tha t the insanity of the respondent is 
incurable 
ft) The court shall appoint for the respondent a guard-
i a n
 ad litem who shall protect the interests of the respon 
dent A copy of the summons and complaint shall be 
served on the respondent in person or by publication, as 
ProVided by the laws of this state m other actions for 
d iv^ r c e ) o r upon his guardian ad litem, and upon the 
c o u h t y attorney for the county where the action is prose-
cuted 
(<i) The county attorney shall investigate the merits of 
the
 c a s e a n c [ 2f the respondent resides out of tins state, 
tak^ depositions as necessary, attend the proceedings, and 
m a k e a defense as is just to protect the rights of the 
resfc»ondent and the interests of the state 
^ ) In all actions the court and judge have jurisdiction 
o v e r the payment of alimony, the distribution of property, 
a n c l the custody and maintenance of minor children, as 
the courts and judges possess in other actions for divorce 
(^) The petitioner or respondent may, if the respondent 
r e s
*des m this state, upon notice, have the respondent 
broUght mto the court at trial, or have an examination of 
t h e respondent by two or more competent physicians, to 
determine the mental condition of the respondent For 
thi$ purpose either party may have leave from the court to 
ent^r any asylum or institution where the respondent 
m a > be confined The costs of court m this action shall be 
aPPortioned by the court 1997 
30-3-2. Right of husband to divorce. 
The h u s b a n d may in all cases obtain a divorce from his wife 
for the s , a m e causes and in the same manner as the wife may 
obtain a divorce from hei husband 1953 
30-3-3. Award of costs , attorney and w i t n e s s fees — 
Temporary alimony. 
(1) In
 a n y action filed undei Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and 
m any action to establish an older of custody, parent-time, 
child supp0 r t } alimony, or division of property in a domestic 
case, thg court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney 
fees, a n a witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the 
other pqrty to enable the othei party to prosecute or defend 
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the action The order may include provision for costs of the 
action 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time, 
child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic 
case, the court may award costs and attorney fees upon 
determining tha t the party substantially prevailed upon the 
claim or defense The court, in its discretion, may award no 
fees or limited fees against a party if the court finds the pai ty 
is impecunious or enters in the record the reason for not 
awarding fees 
(3) In any action listed m Subsection (1), the court may 
order a party to provide money, during the pendency of the 
action, for the separate support and maintenance of the other 
party and of any children m the custody of the other party 
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the 
final order or judgment may be amended during the course of 
the action or m the final order or judgment 2001 
30-3-4. P leadings — Find ings — Decree — Use of affi-
davit — Seal ing. 
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and signed by the 
petitioner or petitioner's attorney 
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted upon default 
or otherwise except upon legal evidence taken in the 
cause If the decree is to be entered upon the default of the 
respondent, evidence to support the decree may be sub-
mitted upon the affidavit of the petitioner with the ap-
proval of the court 
(c) If the petitioner and the respondent have a child or 
children, a decree of divorce may not be granted until both 
parties have attended the mandatory course described in 
Section 30-3-11 3, and have presented a certificate of 
course completion to the court The court may waive this 
requirement, on its own motion or on the motion of one of 
the parties, if it determines course attendance and com-
pletion are not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or m the 
best interest of the parties 
(&) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be held 
before the court or the court commissioner as provided by 
Section 78-3-31 and rules of the Judicial Council The 
court or the commissioner in all divorce cases shall enter 
the decree upon the evidence or, in the case of a decree 
after default of the respondent, upon the petitioner's 
affidavit 
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be sealed by 
order of the court upon the motion of either party The sealed 
portion of the file is available to the public only upon an order 
of the court The concerned parties, the attorneys of record or 
attorney filing a notice of appearance m the action, the Office 
of Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings has applied 
for or is receiving public assistance, or the court have full 
access to the entire record This sealing does not apply to 
subsequent filings to enforce or amend the decree 1997 
30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4. Repealed . 1990 
30-3-5. Dispos i t ion of property — Maintenance and 
hea l th care of part ies and chi ldren — Divi-
s ion of debts — Court to h a v e cont inu ing 
jur isdict ion — Custody and parent- t ime — 
Determinat ion of a l imony — Nonmer i tor ious 
pet i t ion for modif ication. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may 
include m it equitable orders relating to the children, property, 
debts or obligations, and parties The court shall include the 
following in every decree of divorce 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of 
reasonable and necessaiy medical and dental expenses of 
the dependent children, 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available a t a reasonable 
cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of 
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance 
for the dependent children, 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6 5 
(I) an order specifying which party is responsible 
for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabili-
ties of the parties contracted or incurred during 
marriage, 
(II) an order requiring the parties to notify respec-
tive creditors or obligees, regarding the court's divi-
sion of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding 
the parties' separate, current addresses, and 
(III) provisions for the enforcement of these orders, 
and 
(d) provisions for income withholding m accordance 
with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child 
support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a 
portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the 
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or train-
ing of the custodial parent If the court determines tha t the 
circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent chil-
dren would be adequately cared for, it may include an order 
allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the 
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or train-
ing of the custodial parent 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subse-
quent changes or new orders for the custody of the children 
and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and 
for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is 
reasonable and necessary 
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters 
related to children born to the mother and father after entry of 
the decree of divorce may be added to the decree by modifica-
tion 
(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and 
visitation rights of grandparents and other members of 
the immediate family, the court shall consider the best 
interest of the child 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for 
peace officer enforcement, the court may include in an 
order establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a 
provision, among other things, authorizing any peace 
officer to enforce a court-ordered parent time or visitation 
schedule entered under this chapter 
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody 01 parent-
time provisions of a court order is made and denied, the court 
shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees 
expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court 
determines tha t the petition was without merit and not 
asserted or defended against in good faith 
(7) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a 
parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation order by a 
grandparent or other member of the immediate family pursu-
ant to Section 78 32-12 2 where a visitation or parent-time 
right has been previously granted by the court, the court may 
award to the prevailing party costs, including actual attorney 
fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because 
of the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered 
visitation or parent time 
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following fac-
tors m determining alimony 
(I) the financial condition and needs of the recipi-
ent spouse, 
(II) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to 
produce income, 
(m) the ability of the payor spouse to provide 
support, 
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SECTION 523 (11 U.S.C. § 523) 
§ 5 2 3 . Exceptions to discharge.1 
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 
1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from 
any debt— 
(1) for a tax or a customs duty— 
(A) of the kind and for the periods specified in section 
507(a)(2) or 507(a)(8) of this title, whether or not a claim for 
such tax was filed or allowed; 
(B) with respect to which a return, if required— 
(i) was not filed; or 
(ii) was filed after the date on which such return was 
last due, under applicable law or under any extension, 
and after two years before the date of the filing of the 
petition; or 
(C) with respect to which the debtor made a fraudulent 
return or willfully attempted in any manner to evade or 
defeat such tax; 
(2) for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, 
or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by— 
(A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual 
fraud, other than a statement respecting the debtor's or an 
insider's financial condition; 
(B) use of a statement in writing— 
(i) that is materially false; 
(ii) respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial 
condition; 
1
 [Editors' Note: The following is a related provision of section 304 ("Protection of Child 
Support and Alimony") of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394 
(enacted on October 22, 1994): 
(g) Appearance Before Court.—Child support creditors or their representatives 
shall be permitted to appear and intervene without charge, and without meeting any 
special local court rule requirement for attorney appearances, in any bankruptcy case 
or proceeding in any bankruptcy court or district court of the United States if such 
creditors or representatives file a form in such court that contains information 
detailing the child support debt, its status, and other characteristics.] 
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(iii) on which the creditor to whom the debtor is liable 
for such money, property, services, or credit reasonably 
relied; and 
(iv) that the debtor caused to be made or published 
with intent to deceive; or 
(C) for purposes of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, 
consumer debts owed to a single creditor and aggregating 
more than $1,2252 for "luxury goods or services" incurred 
by an individual debtor on or within 60 days before the 
order for relief under this title, or cash advances aggregating 
more than $1,2253 that are extensions of consumer credit 
under an open end credit plan obtained by an individual 
debtor on or within 60 days before the order for relief under 
this title, are presumed to be nondischargeable: "luxury 
goods or services" do not include goods or services reason-
ably acquired for the support or maintenance of the debtor 
or a dependent of the debtor; an extension of consumer 
credit under an open end credit plan is to be defined for 
purposes of this subparagraph as it is defined in the Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act; 
(3) neither listed nor scheduled under section 521(1) of this 
title, with the name, if known to the debtor, of the creditor to 
whom such debt is owed, in time to permit— 
(A) if such debt is not of a kind specified in paragraph 
(2), (4), or (6)4 of this subsection, timely filing of a proof of 
claim, unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge 
of the case in time for such timely filing; or 
(B) if such debt is of a kind specified in paragraph (2), 
(4), or (6)5 of this subsection, timely filing of a proof of claim 
and timely request for a determination of dischargeability 
of such debt under one of such paragraphs, unless such 
2
 [Editors' Note: For cases commenced prior to April 1, 2004, the dollar amount is 
$1,150.] 
3
 [Editors' Note: See note 2 supra.] 
4
 [Editors' Note: The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394 (effective 
on October 22, 1994), added paragraph (15) to section 523(a) and amended section 
523(c)(1) to include cross-references to that paragraph. In conjunction with these 
amendments, Congress should have amended section 523(a)(3)(A) and (B) to include 
cross-references to paragraph (15); this omission appears inadvertent.] 
5
 [Editors' Note: See note 4 supra.] 
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I creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the case in time I 
I for such timely filing and request; 
(4) for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary 
capacity, embezzlement, or larceny; 
(5) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for 
alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse or 
child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce 
decree or other order of a court of record, determination made 
in accordance with State or territorial law by a governmental 
unit, or property settlement agreement, but not to the extent 
that— 
I (A) such debt is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, 
by operation of law, or otherwise (other than debts assigned 
pursuant to section 408(a)(3) of the Social Security Act, or 
I any such debt which has been assigned to the Federal Gov-
J ernment or to a State or any political subdivision of such 
I State); or 
I (B) such debt includes a liability designated as alimony, 
J maintenance, or support, unless such liability is actually in 
I the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support; 
(6) for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another 
entity or to the property of another entity; 
(7) to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfei-
ture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and 
is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss, other than a tax 
penalty— 
(A) relating to a tax of a kind not specified in paragraph 
(1) of this subsection; or 
(B) imposed with respect to a transaction or event that 
occurred before three years before the date of the filing of 
J the petition; 
I (8) for an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, 
insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under 
any program funded in whole or in part by a governmental 
unit or nonprofit institution, or for an obligation to repay funds 
received as an educational benefit, scholarship or stipend, 
unless excepting such debt from discharge under this para-
graph will impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the 
I debtor's dependents; I 
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(9) for death or personal injury caused by the debtor's op-
eration of a motor vehicle if such operation was unlawful be-
cause the debtor was intoxicated from using alcohol, a drug, 
or another substance; 
(10) that was or could have been listed or scheduled by 
the debtor in a prior case concerning the debtor under this title 
or under the Bankruptcy Act in which the debtor waived 
discharge, or was denied a discharge under section 727(a)(2), 
(3), (4), (5), (6), or (7) of this title, or under section 14c(l), (2), 
(3), (4), (6), or (7) of such Act; 
(11) provided in any final judgment, unreviewable order, 
or consent order or decree entered in any court of the United 
States or of any State, issued by a Federal depository institu-
tions regulatory agency, or contained in any settlement agree-
ment entered into by the debtor, arising from any act of fraud 
or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity committed 
with respect to any depository institution or insured credit 
union; 
(12) for malicious or reckless failure to fulfill any commit-
ment by the debtor to a Federal depository institutions regula-
tory agency to maintain the capital of an insured depository 
institution, except that this paragraph shall not extend any 
such commitment which would otherwise be terminated due 
to any act of such agency; 
(13) for any payment of an order of restitution issued 
under title 18, United States Code; 
(14) incurred to pay a tax to the United States that would 
be nondischargeable pursuant to paragraph (1); 
(15) 6 not of the kind described in paragraph (5) that is 
incurred by the debtor in the course of a divorce or separation 
or in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree 
or other order of a court of record, a determination made in 
accordance with State or territorial law by a governmental unit 
unless— 
6
 [Editors' Note Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub L No 103-394 
(effective on October 22,1994), amended section 523(a) by adding a new paragraph (15). 
Although Congress intended to add this new paragraph at the end of subsection (a), 
the language of section 304 ot the 1994 Act states that it is to be added at the end of 
"section 523 " The editors have placed paragraph (15) m its intended location in 
subsection (a), rather than at the end of section 523 ] 
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J (A) the debtor does not have the ability to pay such debt I 
J from income or property of the debtor not reasonably 
necessary to be expended for the maintenance or support 
I of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor and, if the debtor 
J is engaged in a business, for the payment of expenditures 
I necessary for the continuation, preservation, and operation 
I of such business; or 
I (B) discharging such debt would result in a benefit to 
the debtor that outweighs the detrimental consequences to 
a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor; 
I (16) for a fee or assessment that becomes due and payable 
I after the order for relief to a membership association with 
respect to the debtor 's interest in a dwelling unit that has 
condominium ownership or in a share of a cooperative hous-
ing corporation, but only if such fee or assessment is payable 
for a period during which— 
(A) the debtor physically occupied a dwelling unit in 
the condominium or cooperative project; or 
I (B) the debtor rented the dwelling unit to a tenant and 
received payments from the tenant for such period, 
but nothing in this paragraph shall except from discharge the 
debt of a debtor for a membership association fee or assess-
ment for a period arising before entry of the order for relief 
in a pending or subsequent bankruptcy case; 
(17) for a fee imposed by a court for the filing of a case, 
motion, complaint, or appeal, or for other costs and expenses 
assessed with respect to such filing, regardless of an assertion 
of poverty by the debtor under section 1915(b) or (f) of title 
28, or the debtor's status as a prisoner, as defined in section 
1915(h) of title 28; 
(18) owed under State law to a State or municipality that 
is— 
(A) in the nature of support, and I 
(B) enforceable under part D of title IV of the Social 
Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq.); or 
(19) that— 
(A) is for— 
| (i) the violation of any of the Federal securities laws 
I (as that term is defined in section 3(a)(47) of the Securities I 
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Exchange Act of 1934), any of the State securities laws, 
or any regulation or order issued under such Federal or 
State securities laws; or 
(ii) common law fraud, deceit, or manipulation in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security; and 
(B) results from— 
(i) any judgment, order, consent order, or decree 
entered in any Federal or State judicial or administrative 
proceeding; 
(ii) any settlement agreement entered into by the 
debtor; or 
(iii) any court or administrative order for any dam-
ages, fine, penalty, citation, restitutionary payment, dis-
gorgement payment, attorney fee, cost, or other payment 
owed by the debtor. 
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, a debt that 
was excepted from discharge under subsection (a)(1), (a)(3), or 
(a)(8) of this section, under section 17a(l), 17a(3), or 17a(5) of the 
Bankruptcy Act, under section 439A of the Higher Education Act 
of 1965, or under section 733(g) of the Public Health Service Act 
in a prior case concerning the debtor under this title, or under 
the Bankruptcy Act, is dischargeable in a case under this title 
unless, by the terms of subsection (a) of this section, such debt 
is not dischargeable in the case under this title. 
(c) (1) Except as provided in subsection (a)(3)(B) of this 
section, the debtor shall be discharged from a debt of a kind 
specified in paragraph (2), (4), (6), or (15) of subsection (a) of this 
section, unless, on request of the creditor to whom such debt is 
owed, and after notice and a hearing, the court determines such 
debt to be excepted from discharge under paragraph (2), (4), (6), 
or (15) as the case may be, of subsection (a) of this section. 
(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply in the case of a Federal 
depository institutions regulatory agency seeking, in its capac-
ity as conservator, receiver, or liquidating agent for an insured 
depository institution, to recover a debt described in subsec-
tion (a)(2), (a)(4), (a)(6), or (a)(ll) owed to such institution by 
an institution-affiliated party unless the receiver, conservator, 
or liquidating agent was appointed in time to reasonably 
comply, or for a Federal depository institutions regulatory 
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I agency acting in its corporate capacity as a successor to such I 
receiver, conservator, or liquidating agent to reasonably com-
ply, with subsection (a)(3)(B) as a creditor of such institution-
affiliated party with respect to such debt 
(d) If a creditor requests a determination of dischargeability 
of a consumer debt under subsection (a)(2) of this section, and 
such debt is discharged, the court shall grant judgment in favor 
of the debtor for the costs of, and a reasonable attorney's fee for, 
the proceeding if the court fmds that the position of the creditor 
was not substantially justified, except that the court shall not 
award such costs and fees if special circumstances would make 
the award unjust 
(e) Any institution-affiliated party of a [sic] insured deposi-
tory institution shall be considered to be acting in a fiduciary 
capacity with respect to the purposes of subsection (a)(4) or (11) 
Legislative History to Section 523 
This section specifies which of the debtor's debts are not discharged in a 
bankruptcy case, and certain procedures for effectuating the section The 
provision m Bankruptcy Act section 17c granting the bankruptcy courts 
jurisdiction to determme dischargeability is deleted as unnecessary, m view 
of the comprehensive grant of jurisdiction prescribed m proposed 28 U S C 
§ 1471(b), which is adequate to cover the full jurisdiction that the bankruptcy 
courts have today over dischargeability and related issues under Bankruptcy 
Act section 17c The Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure will specify, as they do 
today, who may request determmations of dischargeability, subject, of course, 
to pioposed 11 U S C § 523(c), and when such a request may be made 
Proposed 11 U S C § 350, providing for reopening of cases, provides one 
possible procedure for a determination of dischargeability and related issues 
after a case is closed 
Subsection (a) lists eight [ten as amended by Pub L No 98-353] debts 
excepted from discharge Taxes that are entitled to priority are excepted from 
discharge under paragraph (1) In addition, taxes with respect to which the 
debtor made a fraudulent return or willfully attempted to evade or defeat, 
or with respect to which a return (if required) was not filed or was not filed 
after the due date and after one year before the bankruptcy case are excepted 
from discharge If the taxing authority's claim has been disallowed, then it 
would be barred by the more modern rules of collateral estoppel from 
reassertmg that claim agamst the debtor after the case was closed See Plumb, 
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SECTION 727 (11 U .S .C § 727) 
§ 727. Discharge. 
(a) The court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless— 
(1) the debtor is not an individual; 
(2) the debtor, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a 
creditor or an officer of the estate charged with custody of 
property under this title, has transferred, removed, destroyed, 
mutilated, or concealed, or has permitted to be transferred, 
removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed— 
(A) property of the debtor, within one year before the 
date of the filing of the petition; or 
(B) property of the estate, after the date of the filing of 
the petition; 
(3) the debtor has concealed, destroyed, mutilated, falsi-
fied, or failed to keep or preserve any recorded information, 
including books, documents, records, and papers, from which 
the debtor's financial condition or business transactions might 
be ascertained, unless such act or failure to act was justified 
under all of the circumstances of the case; 
(4) the debtor knowingly and fraudulently, in or in connec-
tion with the case— 
(A) made a false oath or account; 
(B) presented or used a false claim; 
(C) gave, offered, received, or at tempted to obtain 
money, property, or advantage, or a promise of money, prop-
erty, or advantage, for acting or forbearing to act; or 
(D) withheld from an officer of the estate entitled to 
possession under this title, any recorded information, in-
cluding books, documents, records, and papers, relating to 
the debtor's property or financial affairs; 
(5) the debtor has failed to explain satisfactorily, before 
determination of denial of discharge under this paragraph, any 
loss of assets or deficiency of assets to meet the debtor's 
liabilities; 
(6) the debtor has refused, in the case— 
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(A) to obey any lawful order of the court, other than an 
order to respond to a material question or to testify; 
(B) on the ground of privilege against self-incrimination, 
to respond to a material question approved by the court or 
to testify, after the debtor has been granted immunity with 
respect to the matter concerning which such privilege was 
invoked; or 
(C) on a ground other than the properly invoked privi-
lege against self-incrimination, to respond to a material 
question approved by the court or to testify; 
(7) the debtor has committed any act specified in para-
graph (2), (3), (4), (5), or (6) of this subsection, on or within 
one year before the date of the filing of the petition, or during 
the case, in connection with another case, under this title or 
under the Bankruptcy Act, concerning an insider; 
(8) the debtor has been granted a discharge under this 
section, under section 1141 of this title, or under sections 14, 
371, or 476 of the Bankruptcy Act, in a case commenced within 
six years before the date of the filing of the petition; 
(9) the debtor has been granted a discharge under sections 
1228 or 1328 of this title, or under sections 660 or 661 of the 
Bankruptcy Act, in a case commenced within six years before 
the date of the filing of the petition, unless payments under 
the plan in such case totaled at least— 
(A) 100 percent of the allowed unsecured claims in such 
case; or 
(B) (i) 70 percent of such claims; and 
(ii) the plan was proposed by the debtor in good faith, 
and was the debtor's best effort; or 
(10) the court approves a written waiver of discharge 
executed by the debtor after the order for relief under this 
chapter. 
(b) Except as provided in section 523 of this title, a discharge 
under subsection (a) of this section discharges the debtor from 
all debts that arose before the date of the order for relief under 
this chapter, and any liability on a claim that is determined under 
section 502 of this title as if such claim had arisen before the 
commencement of the case, whether or not a proof of claim based 
on any such debt or liability is filed under section 501 of this title, 
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and whether or not a claim based on any such debt or liability 
is allowed under section 502 of this title. 
(c) (1) The trustee, a creditor, or the United States trustee 
may object to the granting of a discharge under subsection (a) 
of this section. 
(2) On request of a party in interest, the court may order 
the trustee to examine the acts and conduct of the debtor to 
determine whether a ground exists for denial of discharge. 
(d) On request of the trustee, a creditor, or the United States 
trustee, and after notice and a hearing, the court shall revoke a 
discharge granted under subsection (a) of this section if— 
(1) such discharge was obtained through the fraud of the 
debtor, and the requesting party did not know of such fraud 
until after the granting of such discharge; 
(2) the debtor acquired property that is property of the 
estate, or became entitled to acquire property that would be 
property of the estate, and knowingly and fraudulently failed 
to report the acquisition of or entitlement to such property, or 
to deliver or surrender such property to the trustee; or 
(3) the debtor committed an act specified in subsection 
(a)(6) of this section. 
(e) The trustee, a creditor, or the United States trustee may 
request a revocation of a discharge— 
(1) under subsection (d)(1) of this section within one year 
after such discharge is granted; or 
(2) under subsection (d)(2) or (d)(3) of this section before 
the later of— 
(A) one year after the granting of such discharge; and 
(B) the date the case is closed. 
Legislative History to Section 727 
This section is the heart of the fresh start provisions of the bankruptcy law. 
Subsection (a) requires the court to grant a debtor a discharge unless one of 
eight conditions is met. [Editors' Note: The Senate Report lists "nine" condi-
tions.] The first condition is that the debtor is not an individual. This is a 
change from present law, under which corporations and partnerships may 
be discharged in liquidation cases, though they rarely are. The change in policy 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SARAH S. CONDIE, nka : ORDER ON PETITIONER'S MOTION 
SARAH S. SEALS, FOR JUDGMENT AND FOR A 
: FINDING OF CONTEMPT 
Petitioner, 
: CASE NO. 9943 00200 DA 
vs. 
DAVID C. CONDIE, 
Respondent. 
This matter having come before the Court on petitioner Sarah 
Seals' ("Seals") Motion for Judgment of Support and for a Finding 
of Contempt on December 8 and 9, 2004, Brent R. Chipman appearing 
for and on behalf of Seals, and Jarrod H. Jennings appearing for 
and on behalf of respondent David C. Condie ("Condie"), the Court 
having heard testimony and argument, and received evidence on the 
issues, hereby finds and orders as follows: 
1. Judgement, The Court has previously entered Judgment on 
issues of arrearages on child support, health insurance and 
attorney's fees on November 3, 2 004. Issues on attorney's fees for 
real property and bankruptcy issues and a request for contempt were 
reserved for this proceeding. 
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2. Contempt. The Court finds that there is no basis for a 
finding of contempt, as the evidence concerning Condie's financial 
condition during the periods in question and the payments on child 
support he did make suggest that Condie was not intentionally or 
deliberately avoiding or neglecting his obligation to his children. 
Accordingly, this Court denies Seals' request for a finding of 
contempt. 
3. Attorney's fees. 
(a) Kentucky f ees: This Court finds that the fees 
incurred by Seals for the services of her Kentucky lawyer, Michael 
Richardson, in defending against a claim by Hopkinsville Federal 
Savings Bank for which Condie had agreed to hold Seals harmless are 
reasonable and necessary and should be awarded as a Judgment 
against Condie. Accordingly, the Court awards Judgment against 
Condie in the amount of $870, plus pre- and post-judgment interest. 
(b) Bankruptcy fees : The Bankruptcy Court in its ruling 
on Seals' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment did not award 
attorney's fees, nor did the parties in their subsequent 
Stipulation and Settlement provide for recoupment of attorney's 
fees for the services of Steven Rupp in pursuing an adversarial 
proceeding against Condie. Those proceedings were the appropriate 
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time and place for the parties to ask for attorney's fees and this 
Court will not grant such fees on that basis. Furthermore, the 
evidence suggests that the adversarial proceeding was wholly 
unnecessary initially, as Seals was not a named creditor in the 
bankruptcy proceedings. Thereafter, the evidence is contested as 
to whether Seals requested to be named a creditor under the 
bankruptcy proceedings or not, and thus Seals has not met her 
"burden of proof on that issue. Finally, this Court notes that the 
Hopkinsville obligation was satisfied in April 2 001, thus making 
any subsequent proceedings in bankruptcy wholly unnecessary as is 
underscored by the Bankruptcy Court's own musings after listening 
to the parties' argument in Seals' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment that " . . .under the circumstances I can't see that there is 
any dispute." (Transcript of Partial Summary Judgment Proceedings, 
pp. 19-20.) Accordingly, this Court denies Judgment for any fees 
incurred by Seals in the bankruptcy proceedings. 
(c) Chipman Release of Lien Fees. Seals incurred $1,070 
in attorney's fees through her lawyer, Brent R. Chipman, in 
obtaining a release of mortgage on Tooele property for which Condie 
had a duty to hold harmless. The Court finds those fees to be 
reasonable and necessary, and hereby awards Judgment against Condie 
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in the amount of $1,070, plus prejudgment interest since September 
20, 2 004, and post-judgment interest after Judgment. 
(d) Chipman Fees for Hearings. This Court finds that 
some additional award of attorney's fees is necessary in the issues 
for which Seals was successful at the hearings in September and 
December 2004. This Court awarded Seals $900 as contribution 
toward her attorney's fees in pursuing child support and insurance 
arrearage in September, and has awarded her additional fees as set 
forth above. The Court finds that Mr. Chipman's billing rate is 
reasonable based upon his years of experience and the billing rates 
of comparable attorneys with similar practices and experience in 
the community. This Court further finds that Seals was only 
partially successful on the issues brought before this Court, and 
that she was unsuccessful on issues in the evidentiary hearing in 
December which incurred the largest portion of the attorney's fees 
incurred by her. Having reviewed the Affidavit of Brent Chipman 
filed herein, this Court finds that Seals is entitled to an 
additional award of attorney's fees of $2,100, and costs of 
$245.71, and an additional award of $440 in attorney's fees for the 
preparation of this Order as an award and Judgment against Condie. 
Mr. Chipman is to prepare the Order consistent with this 
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ruling. 
Dated this 31 day of January, 2005. 
RANDALL N. SKANCHY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order on Petitioner's Motion for Judgment and for a 
Finding of Contempt, to the following, this / day of -January, / 
2005: 
Brent R. Chipman 
Attorney for Petitioner 
215 S. State Street, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Jarrod H. Jennings 
Attorney for Respondent 
808 E. South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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2469 East 7000 South, Suite 204 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Telephone: (801)942-7048 
Facsimile: (801)942-7047 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * 
* 
* ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
* 
* Civil No. 994300200DA 
* 
* Honorable Randall N. Skanchy 
* * * * 
In accordance with the January 31, 2005 ORDER ON 
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AND FOR A FINDING OF CONTEMPT 
and the March 14, 2005 RULING AND ORDER, and finding good cause 
therefor, 
IT IS ORDERED: 
1. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Petitioner and 
against Respondent for attorney fees incurred in defending 
against the claim of Hopkinsville Federal Savings Bank in the 
amount of $870.00, together with pre-judgment interest thereon at 
the rate of 10% per annum from January 16, 2 001 to the date of 
this Order and Judgment and post-judgment interest at the rate of 
4.77% per annum from the date of this Order and Judgment until 
paid. 
SARAH S. CONDIE nka 
SARAH S. SEALS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
DAVID C. CONDIE, 
Respondent. 
2. Petitioner's request for a judgment for attorney fees 
incurred in connection with Respondent's bankruptcy proceedings 
is denied. 
3. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Petitioner and 
against Respondent for attorney fees incurred in obtaining a 
release of the mortgage on the Tooele property for which 
Respondent had a hold harmless duty in the amount of $1,070.00, 
together with pre-judgment interest at the rate of 10% per annum 
from September 20, 2004 to the date of this Order and Judgment 
and post-judgment interest at the rate of 4.77% per annum from 
the date of this Order and Judgment until paid. 
4. Respondent shall reimburse Petitioner for her costs in 
the amount of $245.71 and attorney fees in the amount of 
$2,540.00 incurred in connection with the September and December 
2004 hearings before this Court and in preparing this Order and 
Judgment. 
5. Petitioner's request for a finding of contempt is 
denied. 
DATED this JH day of April 2005. 
Honorable ^ RaAda11 Skanchy 
District Court Judge 
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U n d e r s i g n e d c e r t i f i e s t h a t a copy of t h e f o r e g o i n g was 
s e r v e d t h i s ^ / / z ^ d a y of A p r i l 2005 v i a f i r s t c l a s s U . S . M a i l , 
p o s t a g e p r e p a i d , a d d r e s s e d a s f o l l o w s : J a r r o d H. J e n n i n g s , 808 E. 
S o u t h Temple , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84102. 
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